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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate, through two observational studies, the 
relation among social gaze, play and language in 27 typically developing infants 
(study 1) and 18 yoimg children with autism (study 2). The child's spontaneous play 
behaviour and their spontaneous social gaze behaviours were assessed in a five-
minute free-play observation session. Measures of children's language were obtained 
using the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory, and measures of 
overall mental ability were obtained using the Bayley Mental Scale of Infant 
Development-II. Two hypotheses were tested. The first concerned the relation 
between play and language. The hypothesis was that symbolic play and language 
reflect the emergence of a common underlying symbolic ability in 18-24 month olds 
infants. Results did not show a link between these twin symbolic abilities supporting 
the view that later in development word-learning diverges from other form of symbol 
development. The second concerned the relation between play and social gaze. The 
hypothesis was that social gaze is important for the emergence of symbolic 
development in typically developing infants and preschool children with autism and 
developmental delays. Results supported the view that social interaction is important 
for symbolic and pre-symbolic skills but suggested that the use of social gaze may 
have a general rather than a specific role in assisting symbolic activity. The 
implications of these findings for the developmental accounts of typically infants and 
children with autism are discussed. 
vui 
Introduction 
The second year of life represents a period of rapid development in the emergence 
of language and symbolic play competence (e.g., Bates, O'Connel, & Shore, 1987; 
McCune-Nicolich, 1981, Tamis-LeMonda & Bomstein, 1990). The purpose of this 
thesis was to investigate two key issues of concern to theorists of cognitive and 
language development studying this period of development. The first question is 
whether different manifestation of symbolic ability emerges from a common 
underlying origin. The second is the extent to which social interaction plays a role in 
symbolic development. 
Theorists of cognitive and language development have suggested that twin 
symbolic capabilities, language and play, probably reflect the emergence of a 
common underlying "representational competence" (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, 
Camaioni, & Volterrra 1979; McCune, 1995). Although empirical studies suggest 
some temporal and structural correspondences between early language and symbolic 
play however, evidence for the strength of the language-play relation is not entirely 
consistent. It has been suggested (Namy & Waxman, 1998) that, although early word 
acquisition is a function of a general symbolic activity, later in development word-
learning diverges fi:om symbol development more generally, as infants begin to 
employ those features of language that distinguish it from general symbol use. One 
aim of this observational study was to investigate the relationship between language 
and both symbolic and pre-symbolic (fiinctional) play competence in 18-24 month 
olds infants. At this age most children are actively producing new words as well as 
starting to combine words, and by this age children are also capable of symbolic 
activities that include incorporating others (e.g., doll) in pretend play as well as using 
an object as if it is something else (e.g., using a brick as some soap). Infants appear to 
use symbolic gestures in ways that are virtually identical to the way that they employ 
words. Words and gestural behaviours in play are both used to represent information 
about object and events in the real world. The hypothesis we aimed to test in this 
study was that i f language and symbolic play both reflect the development of the 
same underlying symbolic ability, we should expect correlations between these two 
symbolic capabilities 
In addition to the issue concerning single and multiple routes to symbolic 
development another issue of concern to theorist studying cognitive and language 
development is the role played by social interaction in the emergence of symbolic 
skills (Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 1990; Tomasello, 1999). It is well known for example 
that some social interaction skills such as joint attention (coordination of the infant's 
and other's attention to object or events with the goal of sharing attention) are 
significant predictors of language development (Mundy & Gomez, 1998; Carpenter, 
Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). It is also known that infants check other people's gaze 
when in the process of learning novel words (Baldwin, 1995). However, surprisingly 
few studies have thus far investigated the interrelations between social interaction 
skills and symbolic play (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterrra 1979, 
Charman, 1997; Laakso, Poikkeus, Eklund, & Lyytinen, 1999). It has been 
hypothesised that when infants first begin to use symbolic play these acts may be 
accompanied by acts of gaze to another person as the child negotiates the meaning of 
the act for the other as well as for self (Tomasello, 1999). At this stage children begin 
to understand that another person is doing something "for" them, and then they learn 
to do this "for" other people in much the way that they reverse roles and produce 
linguistic symbols for other people; "the fact that the symbol is for the benefit of 
others is indicated by the way the child looks to other people (and sometimes smiles) 
when producing a play symbol" (Tomasello, 1999, pp. 129-130). The second aim of 
this study was to explore this hypothesis, examining the extent to which children 
initiate social gaze (look to an adult) when engaging in acts of both symbolic and 
non-symbolic (functional) play. 
Autism provides an especially interesting perspective on the development of 
communicative and symbolic flmctioning, as it involves specific impairment in both 
of these social cognitive skills. In fact, these impairments are considered by several 
theoretical accounts to be central to the disorder (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993; Hobson, 
1993; Leslie, 1987; Mundy & Sigman, 1989, 1993). However, although there is 
considerable evidence that the development of communicative and symbolic 
functioning is impaired in children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Leslie, 1987, 
1994; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1993; Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Cox, 
"Baird, & Drew, 1997; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999), the relationship between these areas 
of deficit is not well understood (Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1993). The studies 
reported in this thesis therefore investigated the relation between initiated acts of 
social gaze behaviours and spontaneous play behaviours (functional and symbolic) in 
both typically developing 18-24 moths old infants (study 1) and preschool children 
with autism and developmental delayed children (study 2). Although our aim was to 
explore Tomasello's hypothesis that social gaze may have a specific role in assisting 
symbolic play, it is also possible that social gaze has a much more general role in 
development. This interpretation would suggest that gaze to others assists infants in 
all aspects of learning and is not specific to symbolic play. If this was the case, one 
would expect to find that children also show social gaze with functional play and that 
children who show higher amounts of social gaze also show higher amounts of 
functional play. Even if social gaze is not specifically associated with symbolic play 
but more generally associated with fiinctional as well as symbolic play however this 
may still indicate that social gaze has part in symbolic development. Since fiinctional 
play is a developmental precursor of symbolic play, social gaze may facilitate 
children first in their fimctional play, enabling them to move on to symbolic play. 
This prediction is suggested by studies of children with autism showing that even 
though they have a specific deficit in social interaction, they show developmental 
progress in symbolic development as they mature cognitively. It has been suggested 
(Carpenter, 1997; Leekam, 2000) that, in autistic children, the acquisition of some 
symbolic skills may proceed by using an alternative route to that used by typically 
developing children. However, it is also well known that symbolic fiinctioning cannot 
be acquired in children with autism as early as it is in typically developing infants. 
Overall the aim of this study was to investigate the hypothesis that the use of social 
gaze may have a general rather than a specific role in assisting symbolic activity. 
Chapter 1 - Symbolic skills in typically developing infants 
1.1 - Theoretical proposals 
Researchers from different theoretical traditions agree that a pronounced change 
appears to take place at about 18 months in symbolic abilities. At this age most 
children are actively producing new words (Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Bates, Thai, «& 
Pethick, 1994) and some are starting to combine words and use inflections for 
expression of semantic meaning. In addition to their language use, by this age 
children are also capable of symbolic activities that include incorporating others (e.g., 
doll, adult) in pretend play as well as sequencing the same act to oneself and others 
(e.g., child drinks from bottle and then feeds doll from bottle) (Belsky & Most, 1981). 
According to Piaget (1962), these developments in language and symbolic play 
reflect the development of an underlying symbolic ability, and the beginning of 
representational thinking. Changes in the capacity for mental representation 
contribute to the development of language and play by supporting the expression of 
meaning in these domains (Bates, O'Connell, & Store, 1987; McCune-Nicolich, 
1981, McCune, 1995; Piaget, 1962). 
Bates et al. (1979) extended Piaget's proposal in suggesting that symbolic play 
and language share underlying cognitive structures or "software". In order to describe 
the relationship between these homotypic progression Bates et al. borrowed the term 
homology from the ethological literature, where it is used to characterize the 
evolution of somewhat dissimilar surface structure from a common ancestral form: a 
duck's and a penguin's wings are homologous, a porpoise's flippers and cod's fins 
are not. The term homology is used when there is reason to believe that the same 
underlying factors may be responsible for generating correlations between two 
homotypic progressions. At least three types of homology are possible: 
- Remote homology. Correlation of A and B are due to general maturational factors. 
If remote homology obtained, one would expect correlation between A and B as well 
as correlations of A and B with a host of other maturationally driven variables. 
- Specific homology. Both A and B are outward manifestations of a specific, much 
more narrowly defined underlying factor C. Specific homology requires fairly strong 
intercorrelations between A and B, as well as relative independence of these two 
variable fi'om other variable not influenced by C. 
- Local homology. A and B are related to each other at some points in time but not 
others, because C, an underlying capacity, has several distinct subcomponents. 
During periods when A and B draw on a common subset of C's components, both 
will be highly correlated. During periods when A and B draw on few common 
components of C, they will be weakly correlated. This is the model proposed in 
Fischer's (1980) theory of skill development. 
In relation to the development of symbolic skills, Bates et al. (1979) supported the 
idea of "homology through shared origins" (local homology): within this kind of 
model one would expect correlations between linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of 
symbol development, based on the view that these different aspects of symbol use 
share underlying cognitive structures or "software". 
McCune (1981, 1995) expanded Bates's proposal in suggesting that i f language 
and symbolic play both reflect the development of imderlying symbolic ability, these 
processes would be expected to develop in parallel, with transitions to more advanced 
levels occurring close in time. In McCune's view, both vocal-articulatory behaviours 
in language and gestural behaviours in play are used to represent information about 
objects and events in the real world. Several fiinctions are also shared by language 
and play in the second year of life. First, both involve the communicative function of 
sharing objects with other. Second, children use both play and language to "try out" 
various representational equivalences and so learn about the range of acceptable 
symbolic fransformations (McCune-Nicolich, 1981). For McCune (1992) the shift 
from the pre-linguistic to linguistic phase of vocal development requires progress in a 
number of specific variables, including phonetic skills sufficient for speech, 
communicative capability, and awareness of sound-meaning correspondences. Mental 
representation (cognitive process in which one element, the signifier, "stands in" for a 
separate element, the signified) is the internal component that supports the expression 
of meaning in various modalities, including play and language. McCune (1981, 1995) 
proposed correspondences in the development of play and language that should 
follow from her analysis of developmental changes in signifier-signified relationship 
observable in both domains. Three relationships were proposed: a) onset of the 
lexicon with onset of pretending, b) onset of combinations in language with onset of 
symbolic play combinations, and c) onset of syntax in language with hierarchical 
combinations in play. 
These proposals contrast sharply with other current views in which language and 
play are seen as developmentally unrelated. Some investigators have argued that 
language develops along a maturational course that is independent from other aspects 
of cognition (Harris, 1983; Petitto, 1988). Such developmental independence would 
provide support for Chomsky's long-standing argument that language is an 
autonomous, encapsulated, "modular" cognitive system (Chomsky, 1965; Fodor, 
1983). However, a review of recent literature leads us to consider that at least some 
aspects of non-verbal cognition (e.g. symbolic play) are reliably associated with the 
progress in language (see Bates, Thai, Fenson, Whitesell, & Oakes, 1989, for a 
review). 
1.2 - Definitions 
The observed interrelations between language and play depend also on the 
definition of symbolic play adopted by the research (Tamis-LeMonda & Bomstein, 
1994). Some confiision exists over the terminology employed in discussions of 
symbolic play in general. This is the result of both a proliferation of appzirently 
analogous labels: symbolic, pretend, imaginative etc. and of inconsistency in the 
definition of these labels. Piaget (1962) argued that symbolic ability emerges during 
the period of sensorimotor development as the distinction grows between signifier 
and signified. For Piaget, early pretence symbolizing develops in a hierarchical 
fashion from familiar self-directed actions performed out of context, through the 
symbolic identification of one object with another, to increasingly complex symbolic 
combinations (Piaget, 1962). 
This account has been elaborated by McCune-Nicolich (1981), who proposed that 
the sequence of developments of pretend play behaviours between 8 and 30 months 
exhibits a hierarchical order. The sequence is proposed as ordinal, reflecting the 
gradual transition from meaning fiised with action, to the point where actions are 
guided by autonomous internal meaning (Werner & Kaplan, 1963). Representational 
play develops in an orderly fashion, beginning with pre-symbolic acts (Level 1), 
progressing next to single pretend acts (Levels 2 and 3), then to representational 
sequence (Level 4), and finally to hierarchical pretend (Level 5). At Level 1, the child 
recognizes the function of an object by use, for example when a child briefly touches 
an empty cup to his or her lips then sets it aside. In these cases the observer 
recognizes that this act represents literal drinking of liquid from a cup. However, the 
signifier (drinking gesture) is merely a part of the signified (literal drinking), with 
deletion of swallowing and other consumatory behaviours. This act is pre-symbolic 
and shows the recognition of the relationship between perceptual features of a 
familiar object and action. At Level 2, pretence is distinguished from pre-symbolic 
play by evidence that the child processes the link between the play act and its real 
counterpart. The child essentially imitates his or her own behaviours out of context, 
while indicating by sound effects; facial expressions, or gestures an awareness of the 
differentiation of literal (signified) and played (signifier) behaviours. This suggests a 
mental comparison between the two, and thus an awareness of the distinction between 
signifier and signified. At Level 3, play involves the activities of others, and the use 
of actors other than oneself demonstrates that the meaning of such actions is 
differentiated from the specific bodily acts of the real behaviour. At this level, the 
child's pretence actions based on behaviours observed in others (e.g., cleaning with a 
sponge, reading a book) and uses others (e.g., mother) as actors in play (e.g., feeds 
mother), indicating decentration. At Level 4, a combinatorial symbolic ability 
supports portrayal of a variety of signifier-signified relationships in sequence. The 
child shows recognition of differentiated components of events that can be referenced 
separately by, for example, pretending to drink from a cup, then pouring liquid into 
the cup, or offering a drink to the mother or doll. Finally in Level 5, pretence is 
considered hierarchical when the action follows from internal mental processes, 
rather than being dominated by perceptual aspects of real object in the environment. 
When the child picks up a doll, then searches for a bottle, and finally feeds the doll, 
internal mental processes that are evident from the search behaviour that guide fu-st 
the search and then the play act. A new form of integration is achieved in this case by 
the internal representational intention, which can be inferred to precede and to 
accompany the play action. Similarly, establishment of equivalence between a real 
object and representational meaning (e.g., block = food) or designation of an 
inanimate object as having animate qualities (e.g., making a doll walk) depends on a 
prior representational intention or plan. In this case, the integration is hierarchical, as 
the internal plan is apparent before the play action, and performs an integrative 
function across external behavioural acts (McCune, 1995). 
Leslie (1987) attributed such differentiation to an intemal process termed 
decoupling. In his paper, Leslie tried to explain the external symbolic activity of 
pretending in terms of properties of the intemal representations that underlie it. For 
Leslie, the basic evolutionary and ecological point of intemal representation must be 
to represent aspects of the world in an accurate, faithful, and literal way, in so far as 
this is possible for a given organism. Leslie calls this "a capacity for primary 
representation" that is defined in terms of its direct semantic relation with the word. 
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Leslie argued that this basic capacity for representation is not sufficient to sustain 
pretence. In order for the child to perform the non-literal mental transformations 
typical of pretend play he or she must first be able to simultaneously appreciate two 
alternative and contradictory models of reality (e.g., "This banana is a telephone"). 
This simultaneous appreciation is dependent on the metarepresentational system 
(representation of a representation), a cognitive mechanism which functions by 
decoupling the pretend world from the real world such that the child is able to 
internally represent the external environment in a manner that prevents the literal 
world from bemg corrupted by what is represented in the fantasy world. The 
emergence of metarepresentation through the growth of a decoupling mechanism 
implies a major developmental discontinuity. 
To summarize, Piaget was fundamentally interested in the nature of intelligence 
and how it changes with development, and his interest in pretence was subordinate to 
this. On the other hand, McCime-Nicolich was concerned with the different forms of 
symbolizing in early development and with working out their operational definitions. 
Finally, Leslie was primarily concerned with the xmderlying mechanisms and with the 
information-processing task these mechanisms have to perform in generating 
pretence. 
Recently the growth of research into the play of different subject populations has 
emphasized the need for a stringent definition of what constitutes symbolic play. In 
this regard Ungerer and Sigman (1981) have claimed that complete differentiation of 
objects and actions is necessary in order to say that children playing symbolically. 
Baron-Cohen (1987) also argued that appropriate play with objects or miniature yet 
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realistic objects cannot be taken as evidence of symbolism as the objects may simply 
be perceived as small yet real objects. This kind of play has been termed "functional" 
in contrast to symbolic play. Ungerer and Sigman (1981) provided an adequate 
definition of this form of play: "the appropriate use of an object, or the conventional 
association of two or more objects, such as spoon to feed a doll, or placing a teacup 
on a saucer". Leslie (1987), on the other hand, proposed three fundamental, symbolic 
forms of pretence: a) object substitution - using an object as if is something else (e.g., 
using a brick as some soap), b) attribution of false properties - attribution of 
properties to an object as if they exist (e.g., pretending a doll is ill), and c) reference 
to an absent object - making a reference to something as if it is present (e.g., driving 
a truck over an invisible bridge). Thus, i f a child correctly positions a toy bottle near 
his mouth, as i f feeding himself, this is fimctional play. However, the play would be 
symbolic i f the child held a building block near his mouth, made drinking noises as i f 
he was drinking miUc from "the bottle" and wiped his mouth afterwards as i f milk had 
been spilled. 
All these views have influenced recent empirical research on the early 
development of pretend play. Because of a general consensus on basic theoretical 
questions, effort has concentrated on documenting certain sorts of behavioural change 
Three main developmental trends have been studied.- decentration (moving from self 
as agent to other as agent in pretence); integration (combining pretend acts to form 
sequences); decontextualization (moving away from using realistic objects in 
pretence). The first {decentration) clearly reflect a growing separation of signifier and 
signified within the domain of a child's ovra actions, while the latter indicates a 
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similar separation in terms of the child's relation to objects and their meaning 
(Jarrold, Boucher & Smith, 1993). 
L3 - Empirical evidence 
In this section the research findings related to the language play relationship are 
reviewed. A large number of studies have so far investigated the relationship between 
symbolic play and language development (McCune, 1981,1995; Kelly & Dale, 1989; 
Ungerer & Sigman, 1984; Bomstein, Selmi, Heaynes, Painter, & Marx 1999; 
Goodwyn & Acredolo, 1993; Namy & Waxman, 1998). Kelly and Dale (1989), who 
studied 20 children in the age range 12 to 24 months, found that children not yet 
using words also failed to show functional play, whereas single-word speakers 
exhibited pre-symbolic play schemes and self and other pretend activities. Similarly, 
longitudinal studies of Ogura (1991) and Veneziano (1981) revealed temporal 
relations between play and early language development. McCune's (1995) analyses 
of a cross-sectional sample between 8 and 24 months of age indicated, in line with her 
earlier findings (McCune-Nicolich & Bruskin, 1982; Nicolich, 1977), that children 
who made specific representational transitions achieved language milestones more 
quickly. For instance, a significant association was found between the onset of 
pretending and the beginning of vocabulary development. Children's independent 
combinatorial pretence was also significantly related to the onset of word 
combinations. 
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Research findings regarding the strength of language-play relation are not entirely 
consistent. For instance, Shore, O'Connell, and Bates (1984), did not find any 
significant relation between mean length of utterances (MLU) and fimctional play. 
Only after play behaviour was classified into levels of abstraction, did significant 
associations emerge between sequence length in substitution play and MLU. 
Symbolic play has greater cognitive demands than does functional play with real toy 
object. In particular doll-du-ected play appears to be a strong correlate of language 
acquisition (Sigman & Sena, 1993). Ungerer and Sigman (1984) reported that 
children who engaged in a greater number of doll-directed and other-directed play 
acts at 13.5 months of age had high language vocabulary both concurrently and at 22 
months. At the latter, age the children's language abilities were related to symbolic 
play, but not to the amount of fimctional play in which objects are simply combined 
by stacking or putting one within another. 
Although studies on the relation between play and language have generally 
emphasised that early word acquisition is a fianction of a general symbolic activity, 
implying that infants would learn words and other symbolic forms with equal facility 
at the onset of word acquisition, there is consistent empirical evidence that later in 
development, word-learning diverges from symbol development more generally, as 
infants begin to employ those features of language that distinguish it from general 
symbol use (Namy & Waxman, 1998; Bomestein, Selmi, Haynes, Painter, & Marx, 
1999). For example, Acredolo and Goodwyn (1988) reported that, although there are 
individual differences in the longevity of infants' gestural vocabularies, the use of 
symbolic gestures generally declined markedly following the onset of combinatorial 
speech. Consistent with this finding, Iverson, Capirci, and Caselli (1994) also found 
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that at 16 months, infants used both words and symbolic gestures to name objects, but 
by 20 moths, the infants had essentially ceased to use symbolic gestures as names for 
object categories. This finding implies that, over time, word learning diverges from 
symbol use more generally and that words take on a privileged status in the infant's 
communicative repertoire (Namy «fe Waxman, 1998). 
1.4 - Conclusion 
The second year of life represents a period of important changes in children's 
mental abilities, such as the emergence of language comprehension, language 
production, and symbolic play (e.g., Bates, O'Connel, & Shore, 1987; McCune-
Nicolich, 1981, Tamis-LeMonda & Bomstein, 1990). At the start of the second year, 
children begin to use words spontaneously and to engage in concrete and functional 
play activities with objects. Later in the second year, children increasingly represent 
the world symbolically in both language and play; they incorporate others into their 
representations of events by describing others' actions, possessions, and the like in 
language and pretence toward others m play (McCune, 1995; McCune-Nicolich, 
1981; Ogura, 1990). Some researchers (Bates et al., 1979, McCune, 1995) suggested 
that these twin symbolic capabilities reflect the emergence and possibly the growth of 
a common underlying "representational competence". Indeed, Piaget (1962), 
Vygotsky (1962), and Werner and Kaplan (1963) all asserted that the ontogeny of 
thinking in the child may be concerned less with surface manifestations, that is 
language or play per se, and much more with deep structures, that is the child's 
understanding and use of meaning, representation, and symbols. Although, studies 
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concerning the relation between early language and symbolic play suggest some 
temporal and structural correspondences, the strength of language-play relation is not 
entirely consistent. It has been suggested (Namy & Waxman, 1998; Bomestein, 
Selmi, Haynes, Painter, & Marx, 1999) that, although early word acquisition is a 
function of a general symbolic activity, later in development, word-learning diverges 
from symbol development more generally, as infants begin to employ those features 
of language that distmguish it from general symbol use. 
Having reviewed the relationship between play and language in this chapter, the 
next chapter provides background to the issue of the relationship between social 
interaction and symbolic ability. Intentional communication requires that the child 
has an internal representation of someone else's communicative intentions or mental 
states (Leslie &. Happe, 1989; Tomasello, 1995). It has been argued that factors 
related to individual differences in both the tendency to initiate and respond to social 
behaviours share a common variance with language development. This view is 
supported by the fmdmgs of several authors (Bruner, 1995; Tomasello, 1998; Mundy 
& Gomez, 1998) who showed that some social interaction skills such as joint 
attention interaction (coordination of the infant's and other's attention to object or 
events with the goal of sharing attention) were significant predictors of language 
development. However, although it has been hypothesised that the emergence of 
communicative intention (child's awareness that a sign is understood by recipient) is 
an important part of symbolic development (Bates et al., 1979; Tomasello, 1999), 
surprisingly few studies have thus far investigated the interrelations between social 
interaction skills and symbolic play (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & 
Volterrra 1979, Charman, 1997; Laakso, Poikkeus, Eklund, & Lyytinen, 1999). 
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However Tomasello (1999) has suggested that when infants first begin to use 
symbolic play these acts may be accompanied by acts of gaze to another person as the 
child negotiates the meaning of the act for the other as well as for self The aim of the 
next chapter is to investigate these hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2 - The social basis of symbolic skills 
2.1 - Joint attention and language 
The link between verbal ability and joint attention has been explored in several 
studies (Saxon & Reilly, 1998; Sigman, 1998; Woodward & Hoyne, 1999) with 
mixed results. Much of the research on the connection between joint attention skills 
and language development has focused on the important role that episodes of joint 
attention play in child-caregiver interactions (Bruner, 1975; Dunham, Dunham &, 
Curwin, 1993; Tomasello, 1988). Bruner (1975), for example, claimed that children 
acquire the conventional use of a linguistic symbol by learning to participate in an 
interactive format (form of life, joint attention scene) that they understand, first non-
linguistically, so that the adult's language can be grounded in shared experiences 
whose social significance she already appreciates. Said another way, i f linguistic 
symbols are social conventions that gain their communicative significance by 
"agreement" among users, children can acquire active use of linguistic conventions 
only i f they enter into this agreement by participating in the kinds of social interaction 
that constitute that convention's communicative significance (Carpenter, Nagell, & 
Tomasello, 1998). 
Bruner (1975) laid out a way of thinking and talking about language acquisition, 
not in terms of the structures of formal linguistics, but rather in terms of processes of 
communication. The basic argument is that there is continuity in the process by which 
children conununicate with others pre-linguistically and linguistically. At the root of 
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this commonality are processes of joint attention. In a joint attention episode, both 
members of a dyad are simultaneously focused on an object or set of objects, while 
maintaining awareness of the other member's parallel focus (Markus, Mundy, 
Morales, Delgado, & Yale, 2000). In support of this view, Bakeman and Adamson 
(1986) found that the vast majority of all conventionalised acts (mainly gestures and 
words) by both infants and their mothers were produced when they were jointly 
engaged with an object (both participants focusing on the same object). Moreover 
Tomasello and Todd (1983) found that longer sustained episodes of joint focus 
provide an interactive context, which leads to larger vocabularies in the children of 
such dyads. Language development in twins is often delayed, for example, because of 
the additional time constraints of two infants on one caregiver affording a relatively 
smaller fraction of time in joint attentional episodes with their caregivers (Tomasello, 
Mannle, & Kruger, 1986). Carpenter, Nagell, and Tomasello (1998) found that mfants 
who spent more time in joint attention engagement with their mothers at 12 months of 
age comprehended and produced more language at that same early age and in the 
months immediately following. They also found that mothers who followed into their 
child's attentional focus with words at 12 months of age had children with larger 
comprehension vocabularies in the month immediately following (with relationship to 
language production showing later). Hence, the optimal environment for language 
learning and development in young children may be characterized by greater amounts 
of time spent with caregivers, within episodes of joint attention focus (Markus et al., 
2000). 
In addition to caregiver-child interaction effects, joint attention skills have been 
also associated with language development as they reflect the maturation of important 
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social, cognitive and self-regulatory capacities within the infant (Corkum & Moore; 
Mundy & Gomez, 1998, Tomasello, 1995). This hypothesis leads to the prediction 
that individual differences in infants' joint attention skills, assessed apart from the 
contribution of caregivers, should also be associated with language development 
(Mundy & Gomes, 1998). Carpenter, Nagell, and Tomasello (1998) explored the 
developmental sequence of emergence of these social-cognitive skills in a 
longitudinal study of 24 typically developing infants from 9 through 15 months. They 
found that individual infants showed a reliable developmental pattern of emergence 
of these skills. The most common order of emergence of these major social-cognitive 
and communicative skills measured was: (1) joint engagement (shared attention with 
adults by alternating gaze between an object and the adult), (2) communicative 
gestures (pointing, showing and giving), (3) attention following (follow the gaze 
direction of an adult to an object), (4) imitative learning, (5) referential language. 
Positive correlations were found between the ages of emergence of each pair of 
social-cognitive skills or their component tasks. Mundy, Kasari, Sigman and Ruskin 
(1995) reported in thefr study that a measure of responding to joint attention bids, or 
the capacity of the child to follow the direction of gaze and pointing of an 
experimenter, was a significant predictor of receptive language development. 
Different types of measures of joint attention are not equivalent m their 
correlations with language. Mundy et al. (1995) found that a measure of initiating 
joint attention bids (pointing and showing) did not display the same degree of 
association with receptive language as did the measure of responding to joint 
attention bids (following gaze and pointing). Alternatively, Descrochers, Morissette, 
and Ricard (1995) observed that following gaze at 15 months was related to 
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expressive, but not receptive language at 24 months. In contrast, Ulvimd and Smith 
(1996) have reported predictive correlations between this type of joint attention 
measure and receptive, as well as expressive language development. In addition, 
Ulvund and Smith (1996) observed significant associations between initiating joint 
attention bids and both receptive and expressive language. 
One difficulty with assessing the link between these two abilities is that joint 
attention measures traditionally include a range of behaviours: e.g. requesting, 
showing, pointing, and they include both attention directing behaviours by the child 
and responses to another's joint attention initiative. Current theory on early nonverbal 
communication often emphasizes that the development of different types of joint 
attention skills may reflect a single common cognitive process (Bates et al., 1979; 
Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Bates, Thai, & Pethick, 1994; Tomasello, 1995). 
Consequently, researchers often combine different types of joint attention behaviours 
into aggregate meeisures in the study of the relations between early gestural 
communication and language development (Bates, Thai, Whitesell, Fenson, 8L Oakes, 
1989; Fenson et al., 1994). However, such aggregate measures may be unwarranted 
and diminish the power of research to determine the precise relationship between 
gestural joint attention development and language acquisition. This is because 
different types of joint attention skills may reflect partially distinct processes 
associated with comprehension and expression factors in early social-communication 
development (Mundy & Gomez, 1998). 
Some investigators have found that one of the critical joint attention behaviours 
for predicting language development was pointing (simultaneous extensions of the 
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arm and index finger toward a target) (Bates et al, 1979; Charman et al, 1997). In 
Bates et al. view (1979) the particularly strong relation between language and 
pointmg suggest that this gesture is related to language, not only through a general 
factor of communication with conventional signals, but also through a more specific 
set of structures involved in the act of reference to external objects and events. In a 
sense, pointing, for Bates et al, is really a gestural, sensorimotor form of naming, with 
no fiinction other than sharing reference with the listener. In line with this view, 
Camaioni, Caselli, Longobardi, and Volterra (1991) found that the amount of pointing 
at 12 months predicted speech production rates at 24 months. Butterworth and 
Morissette (1996) studied the relation between age of pointing onset and the 
subsequent comprehension and production of words and gestures. They found that the 
earlier the onset of pointing, the greater were the number of different gestures 
produced, and the greater the number of words comprehended, at 14.4 months. 
Finally, Descrochers, Morissette, and Ricard (1995) foimd that during the second year 
of life the production of communicative pointing was related to both the 
comprehension and the production of language. 
Although the link between joint attention skills and language has been explored in 
several studies (Saxon & Reilly, 1998; Sigman, 1998; Woodword & Hoyne, 1999: 
Mundy & Gomez, 1998: Markus, Mundy, Morales, Delgado, & Yale, 2000), 
surprisingly few studies have thus far investigated the interrelations between 
symbolic play and joint attention skills competence either in typically developing 
infants (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterrra 1979; Charman, 1997; 
Laakso, Poikkeus, Eklund, & Lyytinen, 1999) and in developmental delay children 
(Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman, 1987; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990; 
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Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Cox, Bairs, & Drew, 1997; Sigman & Ruskin, 
1999). It has been hypothesised that the emergenge of communicative intention 
(child's awareness that a sign is understood by the recipient) is an important part of 
symbolic development (Bates et al., 1979; Tomasello, 1999). The second aim of the 
study 1 was to investigate this hypothesis, examining the relation between the early 
manifestation of joint attention skills such as gaze checking and the development of 
symbolic play. 
2.2 - Social interaction and symbolic play development 
2.2.1 - Theoretical proposals 
In Bates et al view (1979) the "symbolic capacity" emerges from the onset of 
communicative intentions and conventional signal including the discovery that things 
have names. As mentioned earlier, communicative intention is operationalised as 
signalling behaviour in which the sender is aware a priori of the effect that a signal 
will have on his listener, and he persists in that behaviour until the effect is obtained 
or failure is clearly indicated, while conventional signal includes sounds or gestures 
whose form and function are agreed upon and recognized by both parent and child. 
For Bates et al. the onset of communicative intentions and conventional signalling 
occurs at around 9-10 months of age for most infants. At this stage we can see three 
important changes in the child behaviours. The first is that the child begins to 
alternate eye contact between the goal and the adult while he emits his signal. At this 
point, it is difficult to avoid the inference that the child sees some relationship among 
the goal, the adult, and the signal. Although Bates et al do not mean that all 
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intentional communication involves shifting eye contact, they require these 
behaviours as evidence that the child is aware of the effects that his signal will have 
as he emits them. The second is that the child will augment, add, or substitute signals 
contingent upon changes in adult behaviours toward the goal. Hence we can infer that 
these behaviours are aimed at the adult agent, rather than the goal-object itself The 
third is that changes in the form of the signal toward abbreviated and/or exaggerated 
patterns that are appropriate only for achieving a communicative goal (e.g. a reach-
and grasp motion may become abbreviated into a short open-shut intention movement 
that is apparently aimed at the adult listener rather that the goal). Another change, at 
this age, is the presence of conmiunicative conventions that can be inferred from two 
aspects of behaviour: 1) the form of the signals change in shape, toward a stable, 
agreed upon version; 2) the signals are used regularly and predictably within certain 
communicative situations. 
To summarize, we can infer the onset of intentionality from at least three types of 
evidence: change in eye contact and checks for feedback, alterations in signalling 
until the goal is reached, and changes in the shape of signals toward a form that is 
appropriate only for communication. We can infer that the child recognizes the 
conventional nature of signals from a move toward stability in the form of signals, 
regularity of use in communicative routines, and the adoption of arbitrary behaviours 
that could only have been derived through imitation in social games. However, the 
kind of conventionalised communication that we observe at 9-10 months of age is 
still not symbolic commimication. For Bates et al. (1979) conventional 
communication is not symbolic communication until we can infer that the child has 
objectified the vehicle-referent relationship to some extent, realizmg that the vehicle 
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(the symbol) can be substituted for its referent for certain purpose, at the same time 
realizing that the symbol is not the same thing as its referent. It is at around 13 
months of age that most children achieve the stage where they discover that the 
convention is a "symbolic vehicle" that "name", "stand for", or "evokes" a particular 
element in that situation. Naming acts occur both inside and outside of 
communicative schemes. Some of the first naming acts occur within the already 
established imperative frames (still accompanied by pointing, reaching, etc.) or in the 
declarative bids for shared attention to object. However, naming also occurs in 
solitary play, as objects are noticed and recognized prior to use in some further 
activity. Apparently the nammg game serves both a cognitive and social fiinction 
from its first appearance by around 13 months of age. It is also around this age that 
we witness the earliest evidence for nonverbal symbolic activity in play. At this stage 
the object is "recognized by carrying out an activity typically associated with that 
object" (e.g., the child places a toy telephone receiver agauist his ear, stirs in a bowl 
with a spoon, etc.). However, it is easier for observers to recognize this kind of play 
when the child uses as his symbolic vehicle a stereotypic behaviour that could only 
have been derived through observation and imitation of adult activities that are 
(probably) poorly understood (Bates et al., 1979). 
Overall intentional communication through conventional signal is viewed as a 
process that precedes, correlates with, and hence possibly contributes to the 
emergence of symbols. However, Bates believes that the symbolic function involves a 
further development, a separate capacity that is manifested m both communicative 
and non-communicative behaviour, greatly changing the form of each. Symbolic 
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activity includes symbolic communication. However, symbolic activity may also 
include some private and often idiosyncratic behaviour (Bates et al., 1979). 
Tomasello (1998) proposed a different view, in which these different social-
cognitive skills in late infancy are all manifestations of infants' emerging 
understanding of other people as intentional agents whose attention and behaviour to 
outside objects and events may be shared, followed into, and directed in various 
ways. During the second year of life the child begins to comprehend that a person 
may attend selectively (intentionally) to some things in the envirormient and ignore 
others (and may also intend for person to selectively attend to some things in the 
environment and ignore others). At this stage the child begins to vmderstand that 
others' behaviours are motivated by special kind of intention, namely, a 
communicative intention. But understanding a communicative intention can only take 
place within some kind of joint attention scene (social interactions in which the child 
and the aduU are jointly attending to some third thing), which provides its social-
cognitive groimd. Learning to express a communicative intention (using the same 
conMiunicative means as in both gestural communication, symbolic play, and 
language) requkes an understanding that the participant roles in this communicative 
event can potentially be reversed: I can do for her what she just did for me. Thus, i f a 
child learns to point for others by imitatively learning the pointing gesture from adults 
pointing for her, then her pointing thereby becomes symbolic. Similar phenomena 
occur during early play development. 
In Tomasello's view, early in development when young infants start to grasp, 
suck, and manipulate objects, they leam something of the objects' affordances for 
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action. Later, as children observe other people using cultural tools and artefacts, they 
often engage in the process of imitative learning in which they join the other person 
in which they understand and adopt the intention of adults as they use objects and 
artefacts (e.g. we use hammers for hammering and pencils for writing) (Tomasello, 
1999). During this process the child comes to see some cultural objects and artefacts 
as having, in addition to their natural sensory-motor affordances, another set of 
"intentional affordances" based on her understanding of intentional relations that 
other persons have with that object or artefact- that is, the intentional relations that 
other persons have to the world through the artefact (Tomasello, 1999a). This 
distinction (natural vs. intentional affordances) is especially clear in children's early 
symbolic play. A two-year-old may pick up a pencil and pretend it is a hammer and 
looking to an adult with playful expression as she knows that this is not the 
intentional/conventional use of this object and that her unconventional use is 
something that may be considered funny. This behaviour involves two crucial steps: 
a) the infant must be able to understand and adopt the intentions of adults as they use 
objects and artefacts; b) the child "decoupling" intentional affordances from their 
associated objects and artefacts so that they may be interchanged and used with 
"inappropriate" objects playfully (Tomasello, 1999). 
Thus, when children begin to understand other persons as intentional agents, and 
so imitatively learn the conventional use of artefacts through them, the world of 
cultural artefacts becomes imbued with intentional affordances to complement their 
sensory-motor affordances - with children's very strong tendency to imitate adult 
interactions with objects clearly apparent (Striano, Tomasello, & Rochat, 1999). 
Although early play symbols are imitated from others, they are also produced for 
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others. In fact children learn to use objects as symbols in much the same way they 
learn to use linguistic symbols. At this stage children begin by attempting to 
xmderstand another person doing something "for" them, and then they learn to do this 
"for" other people in much the way that they reverse roles and produce linguistic 
symbols for others people; "the fact that the symbol is for the benefit of others is 
indicated by the way the child looks to other people (and sometimes smiles) when 
producing a play symbol" (Tomasello, 1999, pp.129-130). 
Overall, then, acquiring the conventional use of an intersubjectively understood 
linguistic symbol requires that the child: 1) Understand other as intentional agents; 2) 
Participate in joint attentional scenes that set the social-cognitive groimd for acts of 
symbolic communication; 3) Understand not just intentions but commimicative 
intentions in which someone intends for her to attend to something in the joint 
attentional scene; and 4) Reverse roles with adults in the cultural learning process and 
thereby use toward them what they have used toward her - which actually creates the 
intersubjectively understood communicative convention or symbol (Tomasello, 
1999). 
These views contrast sharply with other currently influential views in which these 
different skills are seen as developmentally unrelated. For example, Mundy and 
Gomez (1998) argue against the commonality of the cognitive processes that may be 
shared between different pre-linguistic skills. They suggested that since social 
interactional abilities emerge before infants are facile with symbolic skills (referential 
looking and protodeclarative pointing emerge between 6 and 12 months, before 
pretend play emerges between 12 and 24 months of age), it may be expected that the 
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earlier phases of joint attention reflect processes other then symbolic competence. For 
Mundy and Sigman (1993), joint attention skills are not an early manifestation of 
purely cognitive symbolic or metarepresentational abilities, but part of a process of 
integrating self - and other - affect that initially involves primary affective experience, 
which ultimately contributes toward the development of the symbolic representational 
skills necessary for the development of symbolic representational, and later 
development of a theory of mind. Surprisingly few studies have thus far investigated 
the interrelations between joint attention skills and symbolic play competence. 
2.2.2 - Empirical evidence 
Bates et al. (1979) investigated, in a longitudinal study of 25 American and Italian 
children, the relationship between communicative and cognitive development from 9 
to 13 months. They found that the same cognitive capacities that relate to language 
(symbolic play, tool use and imitation) also relate to some preverbal communications 
that precede and correlate with language (giving, showing and pointing). Moreover, 
they foimd in a follow-up from eleven of the 25 infants seen again at around 18 
months, that the earliest manifestations of intentional commimication were the most 
sensitive indicators of later developments in symbol use. Similar results were found 
by Bates, Thai, Fenson, Whitesell, and Oakes (1989), who investigated in their two 
studies the relationship between symbolic play and communicative gestures 
(showing, giving and pointing) in children during their second year of life. In both 
studies, one that made use of detailed questionnaires administrated to the parents of 
95 children between 12 and 16 months, and one based on a laboratory experiment 
with 41 children between 13 and 15 months of age, Bates et al. found a significant 
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relationship between deictic gestures (giving, showing, pointing, ritual request) and 
enactive names (fimctional and symbolic play). 
Charman et al (2000), in a small sample (13 children) of infants for whom 
measures of play (functional and symbolic play), joint attention (gaze switches 
between an adult an active toy and looking to an adult during an ambiguous goal 
detection task) and language had been collected at 20 months of age found that there 
were several cross-sectional associations between the different precursor abilities at 
20 months of age. The findings are consistent with the notion that these infant 
abilities are manifestations of a unitary social cognitive representational ability to 
understand and interact with people (joint attention) and objects (play). 
Research findings on the strength of symbolic play and joint attention relationship 
relation are not entirely consistent with each other. For example Laakso et al. (1999) 
studied children's early social interactional behaviours and symbolic play competence 
at 14 months in a sample of 111 mother-infant pairs. The categories of social 
interactional behaviours, joint visual attention, socially coordinated and object 
orientated interactions were assessed via observations of mother-infant joint play. An 
index of symbolic play was derived from the child's solitary play, which was assessed 
independently. Laakso et al., found that at 14 months, infants' social mteractional 
behaviours (joint visual attention, socially coordinated behaviours, object orientated 
behaviours) and play competence (total number of functional and symbolic acts) were 
not statistically significantly related each other. 
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2.3 - Summary and aims of Study 1 
Joint attention is a fiindamental aspect of early social development that is 
considered to be associated with language development (Bruner, 1975; Bates et al., 
1979; Tomasello, 1995). Joint attention skills refer to the capacity to coordinate 
attention with others regarding objects and events (Mundy & Gomez, 1998). 
Although much of the research on the connection between joint attention skills and 
language development has focused on the important role that episodes of joint 
attention play in child-caregiver interactions (Bruner, 1975; Dunham, Dunham, & 
Curwin, 1993; Tomasello, 1988), few studies have so far investigated the influence of 
the maturation of important social, cognitive and self-regulatory capacities within the 
infant (Corkum & Moore, 1998; Mundy &, Gomez, 1997; Tomasello, 1995). The 
latter hypothesis leads to the prediction that individual differences in infants' jomt 
attention skills, assessed apart from the contribution of caregivers, should also be 
associated with language development (Mundy & Gomez, 1998). 
Although the link between joint attention and language has been explored in 
several studies (Saxon & Reilly, 1998; Sigman, 1998; Woodward & Hoyne, 1999; 
Mundy & Gomez, 1998; Markus, Mundy, Morales, Delgado, & Yale, 2000), few 
studies have so far investigated the relations between symbolic play and joint 
attention skills (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterrra 1979, Charman, 
1997; Laakso, Poikkeus, Eklund, 8c Lyytinen, 1999). Bates et al. (1979) suggested 
that these social-cognitive skills are related to each other based on the view that these 
different aspects of symbol use share underlying cognitive structures or "software". In 
Bates et al. view (1979) the definition of "symbol" emerges from the onset of 
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communicative intentions and conventional signal including the discovery that things 
have names. However, Bates et al. believe that the symbolic fimction involves a 
further development. This is the child's discovery that the convention is a "symbolic 
vehicle" that "names", "stands for", or "evokes" a particular element in that situation, 
a separate capacity that is manifested in both communicative and non-communicative 
behaviour, greatly changing the form of each. Tomasello (1998), suggested that these 
different social-cognitive skills in late infancy are all manifestations of infants' 
emerging understanding of other people as intentional agents whose attention and 
behaviour to outside objects and events may be shared, followed into, and directed in 
various way. These views contrast sharply with other currently influential views in 
which these different skills are seen as developmentally unrelated. Mundy and Gomez 
(1998) argue against the commonality of the cognitive processes that may be shared 
between different pre-linguistic skills. They suggested that since social interactional 
abilities emerge before mfants are facile wdth symbolic skills it might be expected 
that the earlier phases of joint attention reflect processes other than symbolic 
competence. 
Overall, one of the aims of the study 1 was to explore these hypothesis, examining 
in particular the extent to which children initiate social gaze (look to an adult) when 
engaging in acts of symbolic and pre-symbolic (ftmctional) play in 18-24 month olds 
infants. We decided not to include joint attention measures as pointing, showing, 
giving because the purpose of our study was to investigate the early manifestation of 
joint attention skills as shown in referential looking (checking with toy) and also 
because it has been demonstrated that early manifestation of social gaze as shown in 
eye-to-eye gaze (isolated checking) is related to the later joint attention skills (e.g., 
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Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978; Carpenter, Nagell, 8c Tomasello, 1998). Moreover, 
according with the sequence of developments of pretend play behaviours proposed by 
McCune (1981, 1995), and evidence on the development of play behaviours in 
typically developing children (e.g., McCune-Nicolich & Bruskin, 1982; Sigman & 
Sena, 1993), we decided to group the play behaviour into functional act (object-
orientated and self/other-orientated) and symbolic act (doll-orientated and 
substitution). In this way we wanted to investigate not only the relation between some 
aspect of joint attention skills (e.g., referential looking) and symbolic play 
development but also the precursors of these social-cognitive skills as shown in social 
gaze (as precursor for joint attention skills) and functional play (as precursor for 
symbolic play). 
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2.4 - Study 1: Social gaze and symbolic skills in typically developing infants. 
2.4.1 - Introduction 
The first aim of this study was to investigate the relation between language and 
play (functional and symbolic) behaviours in 18-24 moth olds infants, in order to test 
the hypothesis that these two twin symbolic capabilities (language and play) reflect 
the emergence of a common underlying "representational competence" (Bate et al., 
1979; McCune, 1995). We decided to group the play behaviours mto functional and 
symbolic act as it has been suggested that play competence could reflect two different 
imderlying mental capacities: exploratory competence (functional play) and 
representational competence (symbolic play) (Leslie, 1987; Ungerer & Sigman, 
1981). 
Theorist of cognitive and language development have also supported the view that 
social interaction is important for symbolic development (Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 
1990), however, surprisingly few studies have so far investigated the interrelations 
between social interaction skills and symbolic play (Bates et al., 1979; Laakso et al., 
1999). It has been hypothesised than when infants first begin to use symbolic play 
these acts may be accompanied by acts of gaze to another person as the child 
negotiates the meaning of the act for the other as well as for self (Tomasello, 1999). 
The second aim of this observational study was to explore these hypothesis, 
examining in particular the extent to which children initiate social gaze (look to an 
adult) when engaging in acts of symbolic and non-symbolic (functional) play in 18-24 
month olds infants. In this way we wanted to test whether children check at the same 
time as they carry out acts of either symbolic or functional play or whether 
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competence in checking even when they are not playing would also associated with 
the ability of symbolic or functional play. 
In all the two aims of this observational study are firs investigating the relation 
between language and play (fimctional and symbolic) and second investigating the 
relation between initiated acts of social gaze and play (functional and symbolic). 
In order to investigate these social cognitive skills we decided to use a setting that 
was successfiiUy used in a previous study investigating social interaction skills in 
children with autism (Leekam, Lopez, & Moore, 2000). To assess the spontaneous 
play behaviours (functional and symbolic) we used a set of conventional objects (e.g., 
car, doll, spoon, etc.) that could elicited either functional play or symbolic play, we 
avoid to use junk object (e.g., string, lollipop stick, etc.) as we wanted to be sure 
about the symbolic ability of the child. Moreover, in order to investigate the initiation 
of social gaze behaviours we put the child in a chair with a table in fi-ont of him; in 
this way the child had to turn his head in order to have eye contact with the researcher 
that was sitting to the side of, and slightly behind the child without initiating any 
social interaction with the child. Finally, in order to investigate the language 
production we used the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. This 
questiormaire has two forms: Words and Gestures (Infant form), designed for use 
with 8- to 16- month olds children, and Words and Sentences (Toddler form), 
designed for use with 16- to 30- month old children. The latter focus only in the 
production of words and sentences meanwhile the other one checks also test language 
comprehension and the production of gestures. We decided to use the Words and 
Sentences form as it is the most appropriate form for 18-24 month olds children. 
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2.4.2-Method 
Participants 
Twenty-seven infants (14 male and 13 female) ranging in age fi-om 18-24 months 
were recruited from five nurseries based in Durham city. An additional 3 children did 
not cooperate and opted out of the session, and 1 child was excluded as he had a low 
mental age score (mental age of 52). The mean chronological age of the 27 children 
was 21.15 months and the Standard Deviation is 2.41. 
Design and procedures 
The study was conducted in a quiet room or space in the nursery. Children took 
part in a 5-minute free play observation session. The child sat on a chair and played 
with a set of toys placed on a table. The set of toys consisted of: telephone, tea set, 
doll, building blocks, nest of cups, magic baby bottle, plastic fruit, stick, tooth 
brushes, hair brushes, car. The experimenter sat directly behind the child (about 10 
cm) without drawing the child's attention to any toy in the room or telling the child 
what to do. In order to have eye contact with the experimenter the child had to turn 
his head of 90 degree or more. If the child showed a toy or interacted with the 
experimenter in any way, the experimenter could only smile and say "thank you" or 
other appropriate but non-leading responses. The session was recorded by one video 
camera situated in front of the child (3 metres). Moreover toddlers were assessed with 
the Bayley Mental Scale of hifant Development-II (Psychological Corporation, 
1994). This test provided a measure of overall mental ability, including nonverbal and 
verbal components. Finally we asked parents to fill the UK revised short-form version 
of the Mac Arthur Communicative Development Inventory -words and sentences 
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from- (MCDI; Dale, 1996; Fenson et al., 1994). This is a questionnaire used as 
measure of the child's words and sentences production. 
Scoring 
Occurrences of the child's spontaneous play behaviour and the spontaneous 
initiation looking behaviours were coded from videotapes using a 10-second time-
sampling procedure (see Laakso et al., 1999). Child's behaviour was observed over 
six time samples per minute (giving 30 time samples per subject for the 5-min 
period). The observation time started as soon as the child started playing with toys 
and sat in a comfortable position on the chan. For every 10-second period in which 
the child exhibited the criterion behaviour at least once, he or she received one tally 
mark. Thus, the score for each of the coded behaviour categories could range from 0 
to 30. Both spontaneous play behaviours and spontaneous initiation looking 
behaviours were coded at the same time and reported in the same paper. Altogether, 
play behaviours were grouped into functional acts and symbolic acts (McCune, 
1995), while social gaze behaviours were grouped into isolated gaze, checking with 
toy, checking during functional play and checking during symbolic play (the latter 
two categories were included only as qualitative measures). Two different types of 
functional acts and symbolic acts were recorded: 
37 
Functional plav 
Object orientated: 
• Visually guided manipulation that is particularly appropriate for a certain 
object and involves the intential extraction of some unique piece of 
information (e.g., turn dial on toy phone, push car on floor) 
• Bringing together and integrating two objects in an appropriate manner, that 
is, in a manner intended by the manufacturer (e.g., set cup on saucer; put 
together Lego) 
Self-other orientated: 
• Appropriate pretence activity directed toward self (e.g., raise cup to lip, raise 
phone receiver to ear) or appropriate pretence activity directed away from 
child toward other (adult) 
Symbolic plav 
Doll orientated: 
• Appropriate pretence activity directed away from child toward doll (feed doll 
with spoon, bottle or cup) 
Substitution: 
• The use of an object as if it were another object (e.g., using a teacup as i f were 
a telephone receiver). 
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Altogether, four social gaze categories were coded: 
• Isolated checking (when not manipulating or touching a toy child turns head 
to face of adults and makes eye-contact with tester). 
• Checking with toy (when manipulating or touching a toy child turns head to 
face of adult and makes eye-contact wdth tester; social gaze was not coded 
when child was showing or giving object or about to show or give object and 
when child play fiinctional or symbolic way). 
» Checking during functional play (when engaging in functional play child turns 
head to face of adult and make eye-contact with tester). 
• Checking during symbolic play (when engaging in symbolic play child turns 
head to face of adult and make eye-contact with tester). 
Reliability 
One coder (blind to the purpose of the study) coded both child's spontaneous play 
behaviour and spontaneous initiation social gaze behaviours. To assess inter-observer 
reliability, a second coder independently coded a random sample of 30% of the data 
for both play and social gaze behaviours. Overall agreement between the coders for 
the appearance of the play behaviours was 95% and a Cohen's Kappa coefficient of 
.89, and overall agreement between coders for the production of social gaze was 98% 
and a Cohen's Kappa coefficient of .90. 
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2.4.3-Results 
In this section the results are presented in the following order: (1) Descriptive 
Statistics for play behaviours categories (functional and symbolic play), social gaze 
categories (isolated checking and checking with toy), vocabulary production and 
Bayley Mental Scale score; (2) Concurrent association between language (vocabulary 
production) and play (functional and symbolic) in order to test the hypothesis that this 
twin symbolic capabilities reflect the development of underlying symbolic ability; (3) 
Concurrent association between social gaze (isolated checking and checking with toy) 
and play (functional and symbolic) in order to test the hypothesis that social 
interaction is important for the symbolic development. We investigated two types of 
relationship between these skills: 1) general association between production of social 
gaze (isolated checking and checking with toy) and production of play (functional and 
symbolic) during the all session; 2) production of social gaze behaviours (isolated 
checking and checking with toy) during symbolic and pre-symbolic (fimctional) play 
acts. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the means, standard deviations and range for the 
frequency of the play behaviour categories (functional and symbolic play) and for the 
frequency of the social gaze categories (isolated checking and checking vwth toy). As 
can be seen from the data, some categories (isolated checking, checking with toy, and 
symbolic play) have high standard deviations. The Kolmogorov-Smimov test was 
used to test whether the data distribution was normal. Functional play was normally 
distributed, but isolated checking, checking with toy and symbolic play were not 
normally distributed. In view of this we decided to use non-parametric statistic for the 
40 
latter categories. Finally, Table 2.3 present the means, standard deviations and range 
for the MacArthur vocabulary production (number of words) and the Bayley Mental 
Scale raw score. 
Table 2.1 
Means, standard deviations and range for the frequency of functional and symbolic 
play behaviours. 
Measures Mean 5"^  Range 
Functional play 10.78 5.21 1-20 
Symbolic play 2.03 2.55 0-9 
Table 2.2 
Means, standard deviations and range for the frequency of isolated checking and 
checking with toy behaviours. 
Measures Mean SD Range 
Isolated checking 0.59 0.84 0-3 
Checking with toy 2.67 2.46 0-9 
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Table 2.3 
Means, standard deviations and range for the MacArthur vocabulary production 
(number of words) and Bayley Mental Scale raw score. 
Measures Mean SD Range 
Vocabulary production 41.21 19.44 11-80 
Bayley Mental Scale score 105.92 15.70 78-135 
In relation to the frequency of play behaviours all 27 children produced at least 
one act of functional play behaviour, in particular all of them showed at least one 
object-orientated act and 16 of them at least one self^ other orientated act. On the 
other hand only 17 children produced symbolic play behaviours, in particular 9 of 
them produced at least one doll-orientated act and 14 of them produced at least one 
act of substitution. No child in our study showed a symbolic play act without showing 
also functional play behaviours (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 
Number of children showing different types ofplay behaviours. 
Symbolic + Symbohc Functional No play 
functional only only 
Number of children 17 0 10 0 
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In relation to the frequency of social gaze, we found that 11 children out of 27 
produced at least one isolated checking behaviour, while checking with toy was 
produced by a larger number of children (21 out of 27). Only 3 children did not show 
any social gaze acts included in our study (see Table 2.5). In order to investigate the 
difference between subjects showing isolated checking only (3 children) and subject 
showing checking with toys only (13 children) we used a non-parametric test for two 
related dichotomus variables (McNemar's test). A significant relationship was found 
(p<.021). 
Table 2.5 
Number of children showing different types of social gaze behaviours. 
Isolated + checking Checking with Isolated No checking 
with toys toys only only 
Number of children 8 13 3 3 
Concurrent association between language and play 
In order to investigate the relationship between play behaviours (functional and 
symbolic) and vocabulary production correlation analyses were computed using a 
non-parametric statistic (Spearman's correlation coefficient) since some of the data 
were not normally distributed. No significant relationships were found between both 
functional (rho = -.01, p = .99) and symbolic play (rho = -.14,/? = .57) with the 
vocabulary production. 
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Concurrent association between social gaze and play 
In order to investigate the relation between social gaze and play the social gaze 
categories and play behaviour categories were collapsed into two categories: total 
gaze checking (Mean = 3.26, SD = 2.64) and total play (Mean 12.70, SD = 5.53) as 
most of our data were not normally distributed. For total gaze checking category and 
total play category full correlations (Pearson correlation as these two categories are 
normal distributed) were computed. Partial correlations with Bayley Mental Scale 
partialled out were also computed. Significant relationships were found between 
amoimt of gaze checking and amount of play, either with the full correlation (r = .48, 
p < .01) and the Bayley Mental Scale-partialled correlation (r = .54,;? < .01). 
The data for symbolic play were not normally distributed. Table 2.6 summarises 
the amount of gaze for symbolic and fimctional play independently. The data were 
split into 3 groups: 1) no checking at all; 2) between one and 3 gaze checking; and 3) 
more than 4 gaze checking behaviours. As we can see from Table 2.6, only three 
children did not show gaze checking. There was no difference in the percentage of 
children in each play category (symbolic + functional and functional only) showing 
less then 4 o more then 4 gaze behaviours. 
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Table 2.6 
Number of children using different categories ofplay who show gaze checking 
behaviours. 
Number of gaze checking behaviours 
0 1-3 4-more 
Symbolic + functional 1 9 7 
Functional only 2 5 3 
Finally, we wanted to see i f children showed social gaze when engaged in 
symbolic or fimctional play. Children did not check when engaging in play 
behaviours (functional and symbolic). In fact only 7 children out of 23 checked when 
engaging in play behaviours, in particular 6 children checked during functional play 
and only one checked during symbolic play. 
2.4.4 - Discussion 
The first aim of this observational study was to investigate the relation between 
language and play (functional and symbolic) in twenty-seven 18-24 months old 
infants during a 5 minutes free-play observation. We found no relation between 
language (vocabulary production) and play (functional and symbolic). This result 
does not support the view, presented by theorist of cognitive and language 
development (e.g., Bates et al., 1979; McCune, 1995), that language and play reflect 
the emergence and possibly the growth of a common underlying symbolic ability. It 
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may support the view that, although early word acquisition is a function of a general 
symbolic activity, later in development word-learning diverges from symbol 
development more generally, as infants begin to employ those features of language 
that distinguish it from general symbol use (see, Namy & Waxman, 1998, for a 
review). 
However, a different explanation for our results could be the one presented by 
Tamis-LeMonda and Bomstein (1994) that language-play relations are specialised 
rather than global and only certain aspects of language relate to play. Although 
studies on the relation between play and language have generally emphasised 
language production, language comprehension might have as much or more 
theoretical significance at the early ages. Receptive language and symbolic play are 
considered salient indicators of representational competence as they are based on 
similar symbolic-conceptual processes: in vocabulary comprehension a sound stands 
for a object, person, or activity, and in symbolic play an object or person stands for 
another object or person (Laakso, Poikkeus, Eklund, & Lyytinen, 2000). Furthermore, 
also the specific setting that we used in our study may have prevented children 
showing a larger amount of play behaviours, it is possible that if the infants had been 
playing on the floor could facilitate the expression of symbolic play behaviours. It is 
also possible that having a adult in front of him/her could motivate the child to 
engage in more pretence play acts as within the normal game routine. Future research 
incorporating measures of both verbal production and verbal comprehension and 
varying the play setting will help us to clarify the developmental relationship between 
these different abilities. 
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The second aim of this study was to examine the relationship between social 
interaction and play. Theorists of cognitive and language development also supported 
the view that social interaction is important for symbolic development (Bruner, 1990; 
Tomasello, 1999). It has been hypothesised that when infants first begin to use 
symbolic play these acts may be accompanied by acts of gaze to another person as the 
child negotiates the meaning of the act for the other as well as for self (Tomasello, 
1999). The second aim of this observational study was to explore this hypothesis, 
examining the extent to which children inititate social gaze when engaging in acts of 
symbolic and non symbolic play. Results showed an association between gaze and 
play that was not confined specifically to symbolic play. Frequency of gaze checking 
across the 5-minute period was positively correlated with the frequency of both 
functional and symbolic play. This association was found independently of non-
verbal ability. 
Although overall frequency of gaze checking was related to amount of play 
across the session, analysis of each play events showed that children tended not to use 
social gaze at the same time as they carried out acts of either symbolic or functional 
play but at other times when they were not engaged in a play activity. Given these 
discrepant results it is possible that children were either inhibited from checking at 
the beginning and therefore played without checking or the opposite pattern may have 
occurred, they may have been anxious at the beginning and therefore checked without 
playing. In order to investigate these different explanations we decided to split the 
data in two equal parts: the first two and a half minutes and the second two and a half 
minutes. Regarding the play behaviours we found that although the amount of play 
behaviours did not change between first and second (48.0% the first half and 52% the 
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second half), nearly all the children that showed play behaviours during the five 
minutes showed at least one play behaviour during the first half hi fact 25 out of 27 
children showed at least one act of functional play behaviour, and 13 children out of 
17 showed at least one symbolic play behaviours. The same pattern seems to happen 
regarding the social gaze behaviours. 16 children out of 18 did check with toys during 
the first half, 5 children out of 11 showed isolated checking during the first half It 
therefore appears that the children in our study were not inhibited or anxious from 
checking at beginning of the free-play observation. 
Finally a clear finding of this study was that symbolic play never occured in a 
child who did not use also fimctional play. This result supports McCune's view that 
the development of pretend play behaviours exhibits a hierarchical order, beginning 
with pre-symbolic acts as shwon in functional play behaviours and progressing next 
to symbolic acts as shown in symbolic play behaviours. 
Overall these results support the view that social interaction is important for pre-
symbolic and symbolic development. If the emergence of symbolic development 
relies a social interaction skill then children with autism, who are well known to have 
a specific deficit in symbolic development skills and in social interaction should 
differ from developmental delayed children who also have delays in symbolic 
development but do not have specific impairment in social interaction. A second 
observational study was therefore conducted to investigate the relations between 
social gaze and symbolic play development in young autistic children and 
developmentally delay children. This study is reported in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 - Social interaction and symbolic skills in children with 
autism and developmental delay. 
3.1 Introduction 
Joint attention behaviours develop pre-linguistically and involve the triadic 
coordination of attention between the infant, another person, and an object or event 
(Charman, 2000). There is substantial experimental evidence for impairments in both 
the production and comprehension of joint attention behaviours in children with 
autism. For example, Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, and Shemman, (1986) reported that 
while children with autism produced comparable amounts of both frequency of eye 
contact and requesting gestures to mental handicap controls they were specially 
impaired in turn-taking, response to invitations from the adult, and pointing, showing, 
or making eye contact while holding an object or watching an object in motion. In the 
latter situations the autistic children tended to focus their attention on the toys rather 
than divide their attention between the toy and the experimenter, as did the normal 
and mentally retarded children. It may be that autistic children have difficulty with 
joint attention skills because they are not proficient with a flexible, triadic attention-
development (Mundy et al., 1993). In fact it has been found that, compared with 
children with other developmental delays, children with autism initiate fewer 
episodes of joint engagement (otherwise known as referential looking) (e.g., Charman 
et al., 1997) and have more difficulty following others' gaze direction and pointing 
gesttires (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, & 
Brown, 1997). Children with autism produce imperative gestures as often as other 
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children but they produce declarative or sharing gestures far less than other children 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999). Finally, although deficits in 
child-initiated joint attention behaviours were found for both low and high mental age 
preschoolers with autism, deficits in responding to, or following, adult-initiated joint 
attention behaviours were only apparent for the low mental age group (e.g., Mundy, 
Sigman, 8c Kasari, 1994). It appears that at least some aspects of joint attention - in 
particular the initiation of triadic joint attention acts- are severely impaired in autism, 
meanwhile other aspects -such as requesting behaviours and gaze monitoring- may 
be impaired only in younger, or lower fimctioning, children with autism (Charman, 
1997; Leekam, Humisett, & Moore, 1998). 
There is also considerable evidence that the development of symbolic play skills 
is impaired in children with autism (Libby, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 1998). 
However, the extent of this deficit remains unclear. In imstructured or free-play 
conditions, children v^ dth autism produce significantly less symbolic play, but intact 
functional play, compared with chronological or mental age-matched comparison 
groups (Jarrold, Boucher, & Smith, 1993; Libby, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 1998). 
Under structured, or prompted, conditions, some studies have found that children with 
autism produced fewer fimctional and symbolic acts than did developmentally 
delayed controls (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman, 1986), whereas in at least 
one study, children with autism produced as many functional play and symbolic acts 
as did controls (Lewis & Boucher, 1988). Thus, while most theoretical attention has 
focused on the impairments in symbolic, rather then functional, play in autism 
(Leslie, 1987; Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Mundy et al., 1993; Harris, 1993), the 
relationships between the cognitive abilities required for functional and symbolic play 
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are poorly understood. Otherwise, although there is considerable evidence that both 
the development of joint attention and pretend play skills are impaired in children 
with autism, the relations between these areas of deficit are not well understood 
(Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1993). 
3.2 - Theoretical proposals 
Some accounts of autistic psychopathology give a crucial role to early 
impairments in joint attention and suggest that these lead to impoverished 
development of representational abilities that underline the later emerging 
impairments in pretend play and theory of mind. In these accounts, the 
representational system impaired in autism is dedicated to psychological reasoning 
(specifically reasoning about the cognitive or affective states of others) rather than a 
more general cognitive impairment (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993; Hobson, 1993; Leslie, 
1987; Mundy and Sigman, 1989, 1993). 
Leslie (1987) proposed that symbolic play is an early manifestation of the child's 
capacity for metarepresentation, directiy linking the cognitive capacities involved in 
pretending to the later development of a theory of mind. Leslie and Happe' (1989) 
argued that symbolic play are only comprehensible to an observer because they are 
signalled as pretend by an exaggerated enactment, which signals the intention to 
corrmiunicate. They argued that perception of such intention or goal directedness is 
direct but that, while the display is directly perceived, the content or message of such 
displays carmot be directly perceived and can only be inferred by a central 
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mechanism that can metarepresent. This applies not only to symbolic play acts but 
also to communicative acts such as joint attention skills that emerge as forms of 
ostensive communication that require recognizing someone else's mental state 
(Charman, 1997). "This is a fiuther link between pretence and gestures like pointing 
as forms of ostensive communication. In both cases, the displayed acts trigger the 
metarepresentational mechanism, which may allow the actor's intention to be 
inferred" (Leslie & Happe', 1989; p.210). For Leslie (1994) the interpretation of an 
agent's behaviour in terms of underlying intention is the key to the origins of a theory 
of mind 
Mundy and Sigman (1989) have provided an alternative account to the 
metarapresentational thesis proposed by Leslie to link joint attention and symbolic 
play. They provide evidence that joint attention and symbolic play skills are not 
positively correlated in autism, as would be expected in both relied on an underlying 
metarepresentational ability. They argued that a social communication disorder exists 
in autism prior to the possible contribution of metarapresentational deficits and that 
the metarrepresentational deficit does not cause autism but it is a sequela of autistic 
developmental disturbance. For Mundy and Sigman (1993) joint attention skills are 
not an early manifestation of purely cognitive symbolic or metarepresentational 
abilities, but part of a process of integrating self and other affect that initially involves 
primary affective experience, which ultimately contributes toward the development of 
the symbolic representational skills necessary for the development of symbolic 
representational, and later development of a theory of mind. 
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Hobson's (1993) account differs from Mundy and Sigman's in the primary role he 
gives to affect. For Hobson it is the special nature of affective information itself that 
allow the infant to differentiate people from objects and embark on a line of 
development toward more explicit understandings of the mental life of self and other. 
These experiences lead to an understanding of persons as subjects of experience 
relating of the word, which underlies the sharing of attention and communicating 
found toward the end of the first year of life in behaviours such as joint attention and 
social referencing. For Hobson (1989) the capacity to recognize the psychological co-
orientation of self and other acts as a basic for a more general capacity to adopt 
multiple orientations to a given object or situation-as is necessary for pretend play 
Overall these different accounts outlined above propose a special role for joint 
attention in the development of pretend play and the later development of theory of 
mind (see Charman, 1997 for a review). Surprisingly few studies have been explored 
the link between these two social-cognitive skills (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & 
Sherman, 1987; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990; Charman, Baron-Cohen, 
Swettenham, Cox, Bairs, & Drew, 1997; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999). 
3.3 - Empirical evidence 
Mundy et al (1990) examined, in a longitudinal study of a sample of 15 autistic 
children and a language-matched sample of mentally retarded children, the 
development of non-verbal joint attention skills and play competence. At the initial 
and follow-up assessments these children were administrated the Early Social-
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Communication Scales and with a play assessment (Ungerer & Sigman, 1981) that 
provided frequency measures of both functional and symbolic play. The data from the 
group comparisons in this study provided two notable findings. First, joint-attention 
deficits were manifested by the autistic sample in the first testing session, and this 
was before the emergence of either functional or symbolic play deficit. The autistic 
children also displayed significant deficits on joint attention skills at the latter 
assessment. Second, functional play deficits were observed on the second assessment, 
before the clear appearance of symbolic play deficit. Finally, initial joint attention 
skills scores were a significant predictor of symbolic play development at follow-up 
in the mental retarded sample and approached significance in its predictive 
association with symbolic play in the autistic sample. 
Charman et al., (1997) found that, compared with developmentally delayed and 
normally developing children, 20 month olds children with autism were specifically 
impaired on some aspects joint attention. Both the infants with autism and the infants 
with developmental delay demonstrated functional play, but very few participants in 
either group produced spontaneous pretend play. Finally in the developmental delay 
group, but not the autism group, pretend play was shown following prompting. 
Sigman and Ruskin (1999) examined, in a stiady of 70 children with autism, 93 
children with Down syndrome, 59 children with developmental delay, and 108 
typically developing children (with the first three groups of children studied when 
they were between 2 and 6 years of age), the relations between non-verbal 
communication, play and language skills. Non-verbal communication skills were 
measured in standardized social interaction between the experimenter and the child 
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(Early Social Communication Scales), five different categories were assessed: 
initiates joint attention, initiate behaviours regulation, initiate social interaction, 
responds to joint attention, responds to social interaction. Representational play skills 
were assessed in a structured setting in which the experimenter presented the child 
with groups of related toys. Play behaviours were grouped into functional acts and 
symbolic acts. Sigman and Ruskin (1999) found that the children with autism showed 
significantly less initiated joint attention and response joint attention than the other 
groups of children, and they used significantly fewer symbolic play acts of different 
kinds than all the other groups but did not differ from the other group regarding 
functional acts. Finally, in order to assess the extent to which these domains are 
related, correlations were computed between the initiated join attention and the 
response joint attention with the number of different ftinctional and symbolic acts 
shown during play. All the correlations were significant for the children with autism. 
For the other children, the number of different functional play acts was correlated 
only with the responding to bids for joint attention. 
Overall, the pattern of impairments outlined above is quite consistent with views 
that typical development of specific communicative behaviours is part of the 
unfolding of a biologically based, social, or social-cognitive system, which is missing 
or impaired in autism. Nevertheless, despite specific impairments in both the 
emergence of communicative intentions and the emergence of symbolic ability, 
children -with autism show developmental progress in these areas as they mature 
cognitively (Travis & Sigman, 2001). 
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3.4 - The development of communicative and symbolic functioning in children 
with autism. 
Contrasting the timing and course of this developmental progress with typical 
development is informative with respect to basic issues involving the nature of the 
impairments in autism and the nature of typical development. First, communicative 
development appears to be more disorganized than does symbolic development. In 
this regard Carpenter (1997) found that, the order of emergence of communicative 
skills in autistic children in comparison with typically developing and learning 
disabled children, was substantially altered. In typically developing children the main 
communicative skills emerged in the following order: (1) joint engagement (shared 
attention with adults by alternating gaze between an object and the adult), (2) 
communicative gestures (pointing, showing and giving), (3) attention following 
(follow the gaze direction of an adult to an object). However in children with autism, 
the pattern of emergence of these communicative skills was different: (1) 
communicative gestures, (2) joint engagement, (3) attention following. Furthermore, 
considering the evidence from lexical and play development, disruption of symbolic 
functioning seems less a case of disorganized development, as some have suggested 
(Cicchetti, Beeghly, & Weiss-Perry, 1994), and more a case of delayed and arrested 
development. Earlier developing forms of symbol use, such as words and functional 
play, appear fairly intact in autism, although they are delayed. More advance forms, 
such as understanding subtieties of language use and engaging in symbolic forms of 
pretence, do appear to be considerably impaired. In comparing the extent of the 
atypical development for communicative and symbolic abilities, it is clear that 
deviation from typical development is greater in the case of communicative 
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functioning (see Travis & Sigman, 2001 for review). Moreover, autism presents a 
case where basic pre-linguistic communicative intentions are substantially delayed, 
not only in relation to cognitive abilities, but also in relation to language (Carpenter, 
1997; Leekam, Lopez, & Moore, 2000). The appearance of lexical symbols prior to 
well-developed communicative intentions is surprising from both cognitive (e.g., 
Piaget, 1962) and social perspectives (Vygotsky, 1962; Bruner, 1975), because both 
postulate some continuity between early communicative signalling and later use of 
linguistic symbols. It has been hypothesised that the mastery of lexical symbols 
before communicative behaviours in some children with autism would suggest that 
refinement and extension of communicative behaviours is not the only possible route 
to symbol mastery (Travis & Sigman, 2001). Furthermore, it would support a view of 
symbolic ability as separable from its communicative functions. Such a finding would 
be quite consistent vnth the view proposed by Bates et al. (1979), who argues that 
although pre-linguistic signalling precedes and may contribute to the emergence of 
true symbols, the symbolic fianction is a separate capacity. However the substantial 
delay in acquisition of lexical symbols in autism highlights the facilitate power of 
supportive social contexts in typical symbolic development. The earliest symbolic 
words and gestures are acquired at about 12 to 15 months in typically developing 
children, while they do not begin to appear until 20 to 30 months Mental Age in 
children with autism (Charman, Baron-Choen, Swettenham, Cox, Baird, & Drew, 
1997; Lewis & Broucher, 1988; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984). This suggests that in 
order for symbolic behaviours to emerge at around 12 to 15 months of age, as they do 
in typically development, supportive social contexts are necessary (Travis & Sigman, 
2001). 
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3.5 - Summary and aims of Study 2 
Although, there is considerable evidence that the development of joint attention 
and symbolic play skills are impaired in children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1993; 
Leslie, 1987,1994; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1993; Charman, Baron-Cohen, 
Swettenham, Cox, Baird, & Drew, 1997; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999), the relations 
between these areas of deficit are not well understood (Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 
1993). Some accounts of autistic psychopathology give a crucial role to early 
impairments in joint attention and suggest that these lead to impoverished 
development of representational abilities that underline the later emerging 
impairments in pretend play and theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993; Hobson, 
1993; Leslie, 1987; Mundy & Sigman, 1989,1993). 
The aim of the second observational study is to explore this hypothesis, 
examining the extent to which children inititate social gaze when engaging in acts of 
symbolic and non symbolic play in 18 children with autism and 18 children with 
developmental delay. In particular the aim was to test the hypothesis presented in the 
discussion of the first study, that, although social gaze interaction is important for 
symbolic developemnt, the use of social gaze may have a general rather than a 
specific role in assisting symbolic activity. This interpretation would suggest that 
gaze to others assists infants in all aspects of learning and is not specific to symbolic 
play. 
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3.6 - Study 2: Social gaze and symbolic play development in children with autism. 
3.6.1 - Introduction 
The aim of the second observational study is to investigate the relation between 
social gaze and play in children with autism and developmental delay. The videotapes 
from this study come from a previous study investigating social interaction skill in 
children with autism (Leekam, Lopez, & Moore, 2000). The setting used from this 
study is exactly the same as we used in the first study. The MacArthur 
Communicative Development Inventory used in this study is slightly different to the 
one that we used in the first study. This questiormaire has two versions: Words and 
Gestures (Infant form) that is designed for use with 8- to 16- month olds children, and 
Words and Sentences (Toddler form) that is designed for use with 16- to 30- month 
olds children. In the first study we used the Words and Sentences version and in this 
study Leekam et al. (2000) used the Words and Gestures version. 
3.6.2 - Method 
Participants 
Autism (AD) group. Thirty-six preschool children (18 with autism and 18 
controls) aged 2 years 10 months to 5 years 10 months participated in the study. Only 
children with an official clinical diagnosis of autism according to the revised third 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; 
American Psychiatric Association, 10987) the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 1994), or the International Classification of Disease (ICD-10; World 
Health Organization, 1992) were selected for the AD group. The majority of children 
were diagnosed at Guy's or Maudsley Hospital, London, by means of the Autistic 
Diagnostic Interview (Le Couteur et al., 1989). The remainder were diagnosed by 
local pediatricians who use ICD-10 criteria in their diagnostic practice. 
Developmental delay (DD) comparison groups. Children were selected for the 
control group i f they had developmental delays but no sign of autism. Six children in 
the control group had known organic disorders. The others had global or specific 
developmental delays (i.e., learning and/or language impairments) not associated with 
specific disorders. Some AD children had very high IQ scores; in order to match 
these scores in the control group, we included 2 typically developing children with 
IQs and mental ages in the normal range. The mean chronological age and Mental 
Scale score of the two groups are shown in the Table 3.1. 
Matching Procedure. Each autistic child was individually matched with a child 
in the comparison group. Matching was based on nonverbal ability in order to control 
for effects of general ability, which might affect performance (see Leekam, Lopez & 
Moore, 2000). 
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Table 3.1 
Means and standard deviations for the Chronological Age (express in months) and 
the Bayley Mental Scale raw score. 
Developmental delay 
group 
Autism group 
Measures 
Chronological Age 
Mean 53.89 52.72 
SD 6.91 11.13 
Mental Scale 
Mean 68.83 81.78 
SD 36.13 36.61 
Design and procedures 
Testing took place at the University laboratory at the University of Kent. Each 
child took part in a 5-minute free play observation session, however we coded only 
the first three minutes as not all children played during the all section. This 
unstructured play session preceded a long more structured session lasting 15 minutes. 
The child sat on a chair and played with a set of toys posed on a table. The set of toys 
was composed of telephone, tea set, doll, building blocks, nest of cups, magic baby 
bottle, plastic fruit, stick, tooth brushes, hair brushes, car. The experimenter sat 
directly behind the child (about 10 cm) without drav^ng the child's attention to any 
toy in the room or telling the child what to do. In order to have eye contact with the 
experimenter the cliild has to turn his head of 90 degree or more. If the child showed 
a toy or interacted with the experimenter in any way, the experimenter could only 
smile and say "thank you" or other appropriate but non-leading responses. The 
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session was recorded by one video camera situated in front of the child (3 metres). 
The children were assessed with the Bayley Mental Scale of Infant Development-II 
(Psychological Corporation, 1994). This test provided a measure of overall mental 
ability, including non-verbal and verbal components. Finally we asked parents to fi l l 
the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory -words and gestures form-
(MCDI; Dale, 1996; Fenson et al, 1994). This is a questiormaire used as measure of 
the child's words (production and comprehension) and gestures (production). 
Scoring 
We used exactly the same categories that we did in previous study (see pp.36-38). 
The only difference is that we collapsed the two play behaviours categories 
(functional and symbolic) as only one child out of 36 showed symbolic play 
behaviours during the 3 minutes free-play in this study. 
Reliability 
One coder (blind to the purpose of the study) coded both child's spontaneous play 
behaviour and spontaneous initiation social gaze behaviours. To assess inter-observer 
reliability, a second coder independently coded a random sample of 30% of the data 
for both play and social gaze behaviours. Overall agreement between the coders for 
the appearance of the play behaviours was 95% and a Cohen's Kappa coefficient of 
.89. Overall agreement between coders about the production of social gaze was 95% 
and a Cohen's Kappa coefficient of .88. 
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3.6.3 - Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2 and 3.3 presents means and standard deviations for the frequency of the 
play behaviour category (total play) and for the frequency of the social gaze 
categories (isolated checking and checking with toy) in both developmental delay and 
autistic groups. As can be seen from the data some categories have high standard 
deviations. The Kolmogorov-Smimov test was used to testing whether the 
distribution was normal in our data. All categories except for total play were not 
normal distributed. Finally, Table 3.4 present the means, standard deviations and 
range for the MacArthur vocabulary production and comprehension (number of 
words). 
Table 3.2 
Means and standard deviations for the frequency of total play behaviours in both 
developmental delay and autistic children. 
Developmental delay Autism group 
RTOUP 
Measures 
Total play 
Mean 6.00 4.83 
SD 4.46 3.71 
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Table 3.3 
Means and standard deviations for the frequency of isolated checking and checking 
with toy behaviours in both developmental delay and autistic children. 
Measures 
Developmental delay Autism group 
group 
Isolated checking 
Mean 1.72 0.94 
SD 1.74 2.18 
Checking with toy 
Mean 1.61 0.11 
SD 2.30 0.32 
Table 3.4 
Means and standard deviations for the MacArthur vocabulary production and 
comprehension (number of words) in both developmental delay and autistic groups. 
Measures 
Developmental delay Autism group 
group 
Vocabulary production 
Mean 223.00 113.06 
SD 155.46 106.80 
Vocabulary comprehension 
Mean 281.94 179.82 
SD 120.95 117.12 
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In relation to the frequency of play behaviours nearly all children (16 
developmental delay children and 16 autistic children) produced functional play 
behaviour. On the other hand only one child (DD) out of 36 produced one act of 
symbolic play (see Table 3.5). It seems clear that DD and AD do not differ in their 
production of play. 
Table 3.5 
Number of children showing different types ofplay. 
Symbolic + 
fimctional 
Symbolic 
only 
Functional 
only 
No play 
Developmental delay Number of 
children 
1 0 15 2 
Autism Number of 
children 
0 0 16 2 
In relation to the frequency of social gaze we found that 21 children (15 DD and 6 
AD) showed at least one act of isolated checking and 13 children (11 DD and 2 AD) 
showed at least one act of checking with toys. Regarding the combination between 
checking with toys and isolated checking, 9 children showed both social gaze 
categories in the developmental delay group (DD) during the 3 minutes observational 
study but none of the autistic children (AD) did, moreover 10 AD children did not 
show any social gaze behaviours at all. In contrast only 1 DD child showed no social 
gaze. These difference was significant, (2, N = 36) = 16.36,/? < .000 (Columns 2 
and 3 were collapsed to avoid low expected frequencies). 
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Table 3.6 
Number of children showing different types of social gaze. 
Isolated + checking 
with toys 
Checking 
with toys only 
Isolated 
only 
No 
checking 
Developmental 
delay 
Number of 
children 
9 2 6 1 
Autism Number of 
children 
0 2 6 10 
In order to investigate the differences between developmental delay and autistic 
group in the amount of gaze checking (isolated checking + checking with toys) did 
show play, the data were split into 3 groups: 1) no checking at all; 2) between one and 
3 gaze checking; and 3) more than 4 gaze checking behaviours. As we can see from 
Table 3.7, 8 DD children that showed at least one play behaviour did check more than 
4 times, in contrast to no AD children. On the other hand 9 AD children that showed 
at least one play behaviour did not check at all in contrast to only 1 DD child. 
66 
Table 3.7 
Number of children using the total play category that show gaze checking 
behaviours. 
Number of checking behaviours 
0 1-3 4-more 
Developmental delay Total play 1 8 8 
None 0 1 1 
Autism Total play 9 7 0 
None 1 0 1 
Concurrent association between social gaze and play 
As for Study 1 we decided to collapse the social gaze categories in only one 
category: total gaze checking (Mean = 3.33, SD = 2.52 for the developmental delay 
group; and Mean = 1.05, SD = 2.15 for the autism group), as the social gaze 
categories were not normally distributed. However this variable (total gaze checking) 
was not normally distributed. Non-parametric correlation analysis (Spearman 
correlation) was computed. We did not find significant relationships between amount 
of gaze checking and amount of play in either developmental delay (rho = -.290, p = 
.243) and autistic groups (rho = -.159,p = .528). 
Finally, we wanted to see i f children were showing social gaze when engaged in 
symbolic or functional play. AD children and DD children did not differ in the 
production of social gaze when engaging in play behaviours. In fact only 5 DD 
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children out of 16, and only 5 AD out of 16 checked gaze when engaging in play 
behaviours. 
3.6.4 - Discussion 
Some accounts of autistic psychopathology give a crucial role to early 
impairments in joint attention and suggest that these lead to impoverished 
development of representational abilities that underlie the later emerging impairments 
in pretend play and theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993; Hobson, 1993; Leslie, 
1987; Mundy & Sigman, 1989, 1993). The aim of this second observational study 
was to explore this hypothesis, examining the extent to which children with autism 
and developmental delay group initiate social gaze when engaging in acts of play 
behaviours. In particular we wanted to test the hypothesis presented in the discussion 
of the study 1, that although social gaze interaction is important for symbolic 
development, the use of social gaze may have a general rather than a specific role in 
assisting symbolic activity. Results showed that children with autism showed fewer 
social gaze behaviours than the developmental delayed group. Moreover, according 
with previous studies (e.g., Jarrold, Boucher, & Smith, 1993) we found no significant 
difference between autistic children and developmental delayed children in the 
production of functional play. 
If we consider functional play as pre-requisite for the symbolic play appearance 
(as shown in the first study) the finding that autistic children did not differ from 
developmental delay children in pre-symbolic behaviours could support the view 
presented by Carpenter (1997) and Leekam et al. (2000) that, in autistic children, the 
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acquisition of some symbolic skills may precede using an alternative route by 
recognizing the vehicle-referent relationship without the intentional communicative 
function (Leekam & Moore, 2001). The possibility that children with autism can 
recognize the symbolic function independently of making any social or mental 
inferences is also suggested by children's performance on the "false photograph" task 
(Leekam & Pemer, 1991). Children with autism seem able to understand that a 
photograph represent its referent independently of the reality of the current situation, 
whereas they seem unable to make the same kind of inferences for a person's mental 
state. 
However, it is also possible that the specific setting that we used in our study may 
have prevented children showing a larger amount of play behaviours, for example 
playing on the floor could facilitate the expression of symbolic play behaviours, 
likewise having a adult in front of the child could motivate children to engage in more 
pretence play acts as it would happen in the normal game routine. 
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General conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the relation between social gaze and 
symbolic skills (language and play) in typically developing children infants and 
children with autism. Two main questions were investigated. The first was i f 
symbolic play and language reflect the emergence of a common underlying symbolic 
ability. The second was i f social interaction and in particular social gaze has a 
specific role in the emergency of symbolic development. To investigate these issues 
we examined the relationship between two symbolic skills, language and symbolic 
play, to establish i f there were positive relationship (Study 1), and we also looked at 
the initiating of social gaze (look to an adult) when engaging in acts of both symbolic 
and non-symbolic (functional) play, to establish i f there were general rather then 
specific relationships between social gaze and play (Study 1 and Study 2). 
The first observational study investigated the relationship between language and 
symbolic and pre-symbolic (fimctional) play competence in 18-24 month olds infants 
during a 5 minutes free-play. Play and language were not related to each other in our 
study. This result could have several explanations: 1) it could be that, although early 
word acquisition is a function of a general symbolic activity, later in the development 
word-learning diverges from symbol development more generally (Namy & 
Waxman, 1998); or 2) it could be that language-play relations are specialized rather 
than global and only certain aspects of language (as comprehension) relate to play 
(Tamis-LeMonda & Bomstein, 1994); or 3) it could be also that the specific setting 
we used may have prevented children showing more and more frequently play 
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behaviours. Future research will help us to clarify the developmental relationship 
between these different abilities using, for example, different language measures as 
the Reynell developmental Language Scales (RDLS; Reynell & Huntley, 1987) that 
provides separate measures of verbal comprehension and expressive language, or 
using a different setting that could facilitate the spontaneous play behaviours as 
having the child sitting on the floor and playing with aduh in the same way that the 
child use to do normally. 
Theorist of cognitive and langxiage development have being also supported the 
view that social interaction is important for symbolic development (Vygotsky, 1978; 
Bruner, 1990; Tomasello, 1999). The second observational study was to investigate 
the relation between social interaction and symbolic play development, examining the 
extent to which children initiate social gaze (look to an adult) when engaging in acts 
of symbolic and pre-symbolic (functional) play in 18-24 month olds infants. Children 
in our study tended not to use social gaze at the same time as they carried out acts of 
either symbolic or functional play but at other times when they were not engaged in a 
play activity. In addition the significant association between gaze and play that we 
found was not confined specially to symbolic play. These results do not fully support 
the view proposed by Tomasello (1999) that early play symbols are produced for 
others as we found that only 1/3 of the children check when engaging in a play 
behaviour (fimctional and symbolic) and only one child out of 14 checked when 
engaging in a symbolic play act. The finding gives greater support for the view 
presented by Bates et al. (1979), who argue that although prelinguistic signaling 
precedes and may contribute to the emergence of true symbols, the symbolic function 
is a separate capacity. However despite a general faliture to use social gaze when 
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engaged in a play act, infants who engaged in more play also engaged in more social 
gaze across the wide session. This significant association between play and social 
gaze supports the view that although social interaction is important for symbolic 
development, the use of social gaze may have a general rather than a specific role in 
assisting symbolic activity (Vygotsky, 1978; Bruner, 1990). In this regard the early 
development of symbolic abilities in autism may also provide an infomative contrast 
with typical development. 
Autism provides an especially interesting perspective on the development of 
communicative and symbolic functioning, as it involves specific impairment in both 
of these skills. However, although these impairments are considered by several 
theoretical accoimts to be central to the disorder (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993; Hobson, 
1993; Leslie, 1987; Mundy «fc Sigman, 1989, 1993), the relations between these areas 
of deficit are not well understood (Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1993). The aim of the 
second observational study was to investigate the relation between initiated acts of 
social gaze behaviours and spontaneous play behaviours (functional and symbolic) in 
young children with autism and developmental delayed children as a comparison 
group. Results showed that like typically developing infants most autistic and 
developmental delayed children do not use social gaze by checking another face when 
actually engaging in play (in both typically developing and autistic and 
developmental delayed groups we found 1/3 children checking when playing). 
However children with autism did show less social gaze behaviours than did the 
developmental delay group. Finally, we found no significant difference between 
autistic children and developmental delayed children in the production of functional 
play, meanwhile none of the children (except one) in our study showed symbolic play 
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behaviours. I f we consider functional play as pre-requisite for the symbolic play 
appearance (as showed in the first study) the latter finding could support the view 
presented by Carpenter (1997) and Leekam et al. (2000) that, in autistic children, the 
acquisition of some symbolic skills may proceed using an alternative route by 
recognizing the vehicle-referent relationship without the intentional communicative 
function (Leekam & Moore, 2001). These results will support also Bates et al. (1979) 
view that the symbolic function is a separate capacity, however the substantial delay 
in the symbolic development (no autistic children in our study showed symbolic play 
acts) could highlights the facilitate power of supportive social contexts that we found 
in typically developing infants. 
Overall these results (typically developing infants and children with autism) could 
support the view presented by Travis and Sigman (2001), that although symbolic 
abilities can be acquired without finely timed social support, they cannot be acquired 
as early as they are in typical development. However, unfortunately, the method used 
in our study also has several limitations as we saw in the discussions of the two 
studies. Future research will help us to clarify the development of communicative and 
symbolic ftmctioning in both typically developing infants and children with autism. 
For example, a longitudinal study investigating these social-cognitive skills in 
typically developing infants starting at an early stage (before 9 months) will help us to 
understand better the relationship between social gaze (dyadic and triadic) and the 
development of symbolic skills (language and play). Future research should also 
utilize a different procedure such as having the child playing on the floor and/or 
sitting in front of an adult will facilitate the production of symbolic play acts and 
social gaze behaviours. Furthermore studying older autistic children will clarify the 
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development of communicative and symbolic functioning. Some symbolic play 
capacities do develop as children with autism get older and it would be important to 
examine the way that changes in social mteractional abilities change along side these 
developments. 
In summary, despite all its limitations, the present study provided a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of the relation between different aspects of the 
symbolic development as in language and play and the research highlight the 
important contribution of social gaze in the development of pre-symbolic and 
symbolic ability. 
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